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space. Recent comparative Global Labour History research demonstrates that 
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Abstract
The deindustrialization of the developing world is a myth. Modern manu-
facturing extended beyond the import substitution of consumer products 
to modernizing handicrafts, export processing, intermediate and light 
capital goods, and certain services. Developing economies were held 
back, partly by internal factors resulting in low productivity, and partly 
by aspects of imperialism. While some Westerners sought modernization, 
others followed “romantic anti-capitalism”, and Western labour leaders 
obtained protection to save jobs for their followers. Manufacturing did 
well in the era of free trade, and faltered after 1914. The impact on labour 
relations was ambivalent. Modern industry is usually linked to free wage 
labour, but slaves, bonded workers, family members, and part-time peas-
ants all worked in manufacturing in the developing world.
Keywords: handicrafts, import substitution, export processing, imperial-
ism, protection, labour
Introduction
It is argued in this chapter that the deindustrialization of the developing 
world in modern times is a myth. However, no attempt is made to quantify 
the scale and speed of industrial growth in these lands. Only a radical 
re-thinking of the issue will enable cliometricians to begin the arduous 
task of revising the statistics, from the bottom up.
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Historiographical blindness to industrialization in the developing world 
partly reflects the influence of Dependency Theory. For “dependentistas”, 
the purpose of free trade was not to increase the wealth of all while securing 
world peace. Instead, free traders set out to destroy existing industries on the 
“periphery”, prevent the creation of new ones there, and keep manufacturing 
as a monopoly of “core” countries. The public institutions of late-developing 
countries therefore had to intervene in a wide variety of f ields to achieve 
industrialization.1
Jeffrey Williamson has recently restated the deindustrialization thesis, 
while pointing to causes that were economic rather than political. In the 
nineteenth century, terms of trade favoured raw materials, causing the Third 
World to turn to the production of primary goods. Producing raw materials 
harmed long-term economic growth, however, because techniques failed 
to raise the productivity of labour. As terms of trade gradually became 
less favourable for primary goods, Third World industrialization began on 
a modest scale. Williamson further proposes that prices for raw materials 
were particularly volatile, damaging the economies of primary producers.2
Although coming at the issue from different perspectives, these two schools 
of thought work in terms of a priori definitions. As Kathy Ferguson writes, 
with regard to feminism, “The questions we can ask about the world are ena-
bled, and other questions disabled, by the frame that orders the questioning. 
When we are busy arguing about the questions that appear within a certain 
frame, the frame itself becomes invisible; we become enframed within it.”3
As a result of distorting ideological frames, research on the industrializa-
tion of the developing world, and the impact this had on labour relations, 
remains in its infancy. Two decades ago, Ian Brown rightly noted, referring 
to Southeast Asia, that “distressingly little has been written on the growth 
of modern industry”, even though the sector was “surprisingly substantial” 
by 1938.4 Since he wrote that, advances in research have been limited, not 
just with regard to Southeast Asia, but also across all developing economies.
For labour relations, the extent and nature of industrialization in the 
Global South had signif icant implications, though these are not what they 
might appear to be at f irst glance. A larger manufacturing sector than here-
tofore envisaged might seem to imply a more precocious proletarianization 
1 Wallerstein, The Modern World-System; Jean Batou, Cent ans de résistance au sous-
développement; Kemp, Industrialisation in the Non-Western World.
2 Williamson, Trade and Poverty.
3 Ferguson, The Man Question, p. 7.
4 Brown, Economic Change in Southeast Asia, pp. 204, 214.
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of labour than that portrayed in previous literature. In reality, however, 
the types of industry that developed were extremely diverse, ranging from 
enormous state-of-the-art factories to partially modernized workshops. 
Moreover, the social and cultural contexts in which industrialization 
expanded also differed greatly. Unsurprisingly, all the forms of labour 
analysed in this volume were represented, whether reciprocal, tributary, 
or commodified.
Industrialization in developing economies: An overview
Modern manufacturing is def ined as the application of inanimate energy, 
machinery, and scientif ic knowledge to produce both goods and services. 
Supplies of inanimate energy progressed from coal-f ired steam engines, 
through oil-f ired engines, to electric motors. From this perspective, it makes 
no sense to limit industrialization to the import substitution of consumer 
goods for the internal market, as Gregg Huff does for Malaya. Indeed, he 
soon f inds himself obliged to consider other forms of manufacturing.5 It 
is even more perilous to take the production of f inished textiles for the 
internal market as a proxy for industrialization, as Williamson does, fol-
lowing in the footsteps of many before him.6 Communist commentators 
demonstrated yet another ideological obsession, by stressing heavy capital 
goods, for example, at the Sixth Comintern Congress of 1928.7
A more satisfactory enframing of industrialization must extend to types of 
manufacturing other than the factory-based import substitution of consumer 
goods. Export-substituting plant, processing raw materials for foreign mar-
kets, was of great significance. The frame of reference should also be enlarged 
to consider the production of intermediate and light capital goods for internal 
consumption, industrialized services, and handicrafts, all of which almost 
imperceptibly became industrial. Although there remains a crucial question 
as to why most developing economies did not industrialize more deeply and 
more rapidly, it is wise to begin with what was actually achieved.
The balance between the impact of internal and external factors on 
industrialization is hard to establish. As Sidney Pollard observes, internal 
factors largely explain why Scandinavia overcame the challenges faced by 
the “third wave” of industrialization, whereas many parts of southern and 
5 Huff, “Boom-or-Bust Commodities”, p. 1075 (n2).
6 Williamson, Trade and Poverty, pp. 60-61.
7 Tyabji, Colonialism, pp. 2-3.
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eastern Europe did not.8 Internal factors could be institutional in a narrow 
sense, for example, in terms of governance, but could also embrace wider 
social and cultural factors, which would fall into Douglass North’s broad 
definition of institutions.9 In this vein, historians of East Asia have debated 
skill sets, and views of society and the world.10
Imperialism is the external factor most commonly blamed for hamper-
ing industrialization, but its impact was equivocal. Westerners sometimes 
attempted to impose a package of relentless modernization on “the rest”, 
including factories.11 Vietnam was set to become a “new Japan” in the 1930s, 
even though the plans met with strong domestic opposition in France, and 
were only partially enacted before the outbreak of war.12 At the opposite end of 
the spectrum, an ethos of romantic anti-capitalism sought to protect subjects 
from “dark Satanic mills”.13 One example was Catholic missionary theocracies 
in Angola, harking back to the famous Jesuit Reductions of Paraguay.14
To the extent that imperialist protectionism harmed industrial growth 
in developing economies, it often originated in institutions of organized 
labour. Leaders flexed their growing muscles – industrial and political – 
to hinder the establishment of factories on the periphery, believing that 
they were saving jobs at home for their members. Trade unionists allied 
with marginal and declining industrialists, whereas many dynamic and 
successful entrepreneurs favoured peripheral industrialization. Jacques 
Marseille was a pioneer of analysing this process in France and its empire, 
and it could also be observed in the Portuguese case.15
In terms of periodization, Williamson wrongly asserts that the nadir 
of Third World industry correlated with the zenith of free trade in the 
long nineteenth century. The era of free trade actually involved a rapid 
development of factories for export processing and intermediate goods, 
the industrialization of some services, and a hesitant emergence of import-
substituting industries, whether craft based or not. Conditions were 
favourable in many respects. The “colonial peace” was generally achieved 
quickly and cheaply, due to the technological gap between the West and the 
8 Pollard, Peaceful Conquest, pp. 220-221, 233-234.
9 North, Institutions.
10 Chan, Business Expansion; Tanimoto, The Role of Tradition.
11 Warren, Imperialism.
12 Bernard, Nouveaux aspects, pp. 79-84.
13 Löwy and Sayre, Romanticism; Kaarsholm, Imperialism.
14 Clarence-Smith, Slaves, pp. 89-93.
15 Marseille, Empire colonial; Marseille, “The Phases of French Colonial imperialism”; Clarence-
Smith, The Third Portuguese Empire.
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rest.16 Existing infrastructure remained largely unscathed by f ighting, and 
security favoured investment in expensive, risky, and lumpy f ixed capital 
assets.17 International migration lowered labour costs and raised skills, 
and the “coolie system” was not a modern form of slavery.18 Non-Western 
diasporic entrepreneurs brought capital, commercial skills, and an intimate 
knowledge of markets. They were usually more active and effective in 
fomenting early manufacturing than f irms from colonial metropoles.19
By contrast, growing protectionism, particularly from 1914, did much 
less than Williamson asserts to boost industrialization in developing 
economies. Protection negatively affected export substitution, while timid 
attempts at import substitution were incoherent, ineffective, and at times 
counterproductive. Deepak Lal elegantly argues this for the Indian case, 
with a wealth of statistical data.20
Overall, the industrialization of developing economies consisted of 
loosely connected strands. Some craft workshops evolved into indus-
trial units, while new factories emerged from the 1850s. Both sectors were 
oriented to the internal market, but also exported their wares. Modern 
factories supplied intermediate goods, including light capital equipment, to 
local and regional markets, simultaneously sustaining newly industrialized 
transport and energy services. The processing of “primary goods”, chiefly 
for export, was probably the most signif icant industrial development, yet 
scholars have accorded little importance to this phenomenon.21
The nine lives of artisans
Logically, dependentistas are wrong to point to the alleged destruction of 
handicrafts as deindustrialization, because households and workshops 
were not modern factories. Artisans worked with simple tools, employed 
mainly human or animal energy, and relied on useful and reliable knowl-
edge, as in the case of Persia.22 However, crafts are important to this story, 
16 Callwell, Small Wars.
17 Ferguson, Empire.
18 Northrup, Indentured Labor. 
19 Cohen, Global Diasporas; Baghdiantz McCabe, Harlaftis, and Pepelasis Minoglou, Diaspora 
Entrepreneurial Networks; Dobbin, Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities; Clarence-Smith, “Indian 
and Arab Entrepreneurs”.
20 Lal, The Hindu Equilibrium, pp. 189-198.
21 Pomeranz, The Pacific.
22 Mohebbi, Techniques.
34 wILLIam G. CLaRenCe-SmItH 
not only because they survived more effectively than dependentistas 
allege, but also because some of them gradually approximated to modern 
industries.
The cause célèbre of the imperialist “destruction” of crafts is the fate 
of Indian weaving, dominant in the global cotton textile markets of the 
eighteenth century.23 A tweet that went viral in 2015 put the argument 
in dramatic terms: “The British cut off the thumbs of Bengali weavers, 
smashed their looms, and placed high duties on textile imports into Britain 
from India.”24 The last accusation is partly true, even if the tariff of 1813 was 
introduced in a large part to f inance the Napoleonic Wars, and imports 
from India failed to recover when British tariffs soon fell again in times of 
peace.25 As for allegations of cutting off thumbs and breaking looms, they are 
unsupported by evidence, and contrary to logic. The East India Company, 
which governed India until 1858, benefited from exporting locally woven 
textiles to Britain, and feared nothing more than an uprising in India. 
References to cutting off weavers’ thumbs are indeed heard in Bengal into 
our own times, but in a metaphorical sense.26
Karl Marx’s argument, in Das Kapital, was instead that Indian handicrafts 
succumbed to imports of cheap industrial goods. He thus stresses the power 
of machines to create unemployment. In support of his position, Marx cites 
Governor-General William Bentinck in 1834, to the effect that “the bones 
of the cotton weavers are bleaching the plains of India”.27 However, Marx 
never went to India, and his apocalyptic portrayal has been undermined 
by decades of painstaking research. Historians now argue that free trade 
neither destroyed nor devitalized Indian artisans across the board. Instead, 
the fortunes of different crafts varied tremendously. Hand spinning of 
yarn retrogressed, whereas handloom weaving boomed, stimulated by the 
availability of cheap, strong, consistent, machine-made yarn. Dyeing and 
printing similarly benefited from imports of industrial dyes. The fate of all 
branches often depended on niche markets.28
The situation in China was similar. As late as 1933, some two-thirds 
of China’s sizeable manufacturing output was estimated to come from 
the artisanal sector. Albert Feuerwerker acknowledges that imports, 
23 Parthasarathi, Why Europe Grew Rich.
24 Tharoor, “Viewpoint”. Thanks to Peter Clarence-Smith for drawing my attention to this.
25 Lal, The Hindu Equilibrium, p. 183.
26 Dhamija, “Regional Weavers of India”, p. 142.
27 Elster, Karl Marx, p. 94.
28 Roy, Traditional Industry, pp. 20-23, 61-65; Charlesworth, British Rule, pp. 33-34; Haynes, 
Small Town Capitalism, pp. 5-18; Tyabji, Colonialism, pp. 25-26.
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increasingly from Japan rather than the West, disrupted handicrafts, but 
he also demonstrates how some branches effectively reorganized and ex-
panded. Thus, though spinning generally declined, some weavers blended 
hand-spun weft with machine-made warp, to produce a more durable cloth. 
Oil pressing and rice milling were among other sectors that stood up well 
to competition from imports.29
Historians of the Middle East have proposed a revisionist account along 
the same lines.30 Although hand spinning declined, neither wheel nor spin-
dle vanished. Indeed, in 1900, hand-spun yarn still accounted for about a 
quarter of Ottoman needs. As in China, artisans mixed machine-made warp 
and hand-made weft to produce a popular fabric.31 Overall, Suraiya Faroqhi 
opines, there was probably no absolute decline in Ottoman handicrafts, in 
terms of either output or employment.32
Charles Issawi initially accepted the notion of the destruction of crafts, 
but by 1982 he had come to recognize that retrogression in some sectors, 
such as spinning, was counterbalanced by expansion in others. Examples 
of growth include weaving with imported machine-made yarn, and dyeing 
and printing with imported aniline dyes. In the same way, metals, leather, 
wood, pottery, and glass experienced varying fates.33
Guilds have bedevilled the issue in the Middle East, because historians 
have taken the decline of these institutions as a proxy for the retrogression 
of handicrafts. However, local elites, obsessed with political opposition from 
guilds, and dreaming romantically of factories, scarcely noticed the large 
and growing number of non-guild crafts, which were especially prevalent 
in rural areas.34
As for other parts of the world, Donald Quataert exaggerates when he 
suggests that there were lightly populated economies that “entirely de-
industrialized and switched over to the agricultural or emerging service 
sectors of the new, Third, world”.35 Kenneth Pomeranz sees the allure of 
this view, but rightly notes a need for careful qualif ication.36 Southeast 
Asia is especially relevant in this regard, as geography opened the region to 
29 Feuerwerker, The Chinese Economy, pp. 30-43; Feuerwerker, “Handicraft”; Myers, The Chinese 
Economy, pp. 133-134.
30 Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing; Owen, The Middle East.
31 Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing, pp. 23-24, 36-40, 148-149.
32 Faroqhi, Artisans of Empire, pp. 186-188, 192-193, 195-196.
33 Issawi, An Economic History, pp. 151-153. See also Owen, The Middle East, pp. 93-95.
34 Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing, pp. 6-14.
35 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
36 Pomeranz, The Pacific, pp. xiv-xvii, xxxvi.
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sea-borne imports more than anywhere else on the globe. And yet, weaving 
grew, stimulated by the availability of machine-made yarn. Dyeing, notably 
the reputed batiks of Java, benefited from supplies of machine-made cambric 
cloth and industrial dyes.37 Even spinning persisted, for example, in the 
eastern archipelago, where both drop-spindles and wheels continued into 
modern times.38
Some of Sub-Saharan Africa’s artisans also survived and adapted, 
such as producers of cotton textiles in West Africa.39 Indeed, the British 
famously failed to turn Northern Nigeria into a supplier of raw cotton 
for Lancashire mills after 1900, in part because dynamic Hausa spinners 
eagerly bought up the local crop. Moreover, to supplement local supplies, 
machine-made yarn and plain cloth came on the back of camels across 
the Sahara, boosting weaving and dyeing.40 Even in eastern and south-
ern Africa, where some scholars pronounced the unequivocal death of 
hand-made textiles, some survived.41 The artisans of southern Somalia, 
who spun cotton with wheels and wove it into cloth, prospered in the 
nineteenth century.42
Latin America’s handicrafts were also more resilient than has often 
been stated.43 Natural protection, local tastes, and low incomes played a 
role in ensuring that artisans continued to ply their trade.44 Survival, and 
expansion in places, also reflected indigenous Amerindian workmanship 
and patterns of consumption, stretching back to before the European 
conquest. The Mayan cultural zone of Mesoamerica was a good example 
of this phenomenon.45
Export markets and the stimulation of handicrafts
Far from merely serving stagnant rural zones and nostalgic cultural 
norms, artisans exploited rapidly expanding urban markets and new 
37 Matsuo, Javanese Cotton Industry, pp. 12-17; Kerlogue, Batik; Brown, Economic Change. See 
Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk’s chapter in this volume.
38 Hamilton, Gift of the Cotton Maiden, pp. 61, 233.
39 Kriger, Cloth in West African History.
40 Candotti, “Cotton Growing”.
41 Davison and Harries, “Cotton Weaving”; Clarence-Smith, “Textile Industry”.
42 Alpers, “Futa Benaadir”.
43 Halperín Donghi, “Economy and Society”, pp. 326-327.
44 Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History, pp. 130-132.
45 Martin, “Weaving the World”.
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export opportunities in the West. Forms of export processing long re-
mained artisanal, as in the case of Western Africa’s hand-pressed palm 
oil.46 Purchases of hand-made exotic objects benef ited from the Arts and 
Crafts movement, inspired by William Morris, together with burgeoning 
Orientalist ideals.47
Hand-made rugs and carpets fared particularly well, in part because 
production was technically diff icult to mechanize. Western demand 
sparked signif icant growth in artisanal production in the Middle East 
and India, from as early as the 1820s. Between 1889 and 1913, the value 
of Ottoman carpet exports doubled, and Iran also benef ited.48 In India, 
where carpets had largely been procured from Inner Asia, export op-
portunities positively transformed artisanal activity.49 Embroidery and 
lace are other examples, with nineteenth-century Ottoman exports of 
both increasing rapidly.50 Although Swiss machines that could produce 
a reasonable type of lace emerged from around the 1880s, the quality 
of machine-made embroidery remained unsatisfactory. Exports of hand 
embroidery thus thrived, coming initially from Europe, but increasingly 
from China and the Philippines, especially after the First World War had 
disrupted commercial circuits.51
Swelling numbers of tourists and pilgrims stimulated f irst the sales, and 
then the exports, of hand-crafted mementos and souvenirs, notably early 
in Egypt.52 Sindhi Lohana merchants from Hyderabad, today in Pakistan, 
were quick to seize the opportunity. Settling in many ports around the 
globe, they sold hand-crafted “curios” to travellers, and later distributed 
Japanese silks around the world.53 Palestine’s bustling workshops began by 
making religious items for pilgrims out of olive wood and mother-of-pearl. 
Bethlehemite Christian Arabs then gradually dispersed, peddling these 
items in devoutly Christian lands around the planet.54
46 Hartley, The Oil Palm, ch. 14; Martin, Palm Oil and Protest.
47 Cumming and Kaplan, The Arts and Crafts Movement; Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing, 
p. 134; Roy, Traditional Industry, pp. 133, 201-202, 204.
48 Issawi, An Economic History, p. 153; Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing, ch. 5; Owen, The 
Middle East, p. 212.
49 Roy, Traditional Industry, ch. 7.
50 Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing, pp. 16, 132.
51 Amoroso Leslie, Needlework through History.
52 Faroqhi, Artisans of Empire, p. 187.
53 Markovits, The Global World.
54 Norris, “Exporting The Holy Land”.
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From crafts to modern industry: Institutional and technical factors
Scholars are ambivalent about the role of technical versus institutional 
change in the handicraft sector, for example in British India. In addition 
to an increasingly elaborate division of labour, workshops grew in size 
and moved into cities. Their owners slowly became more autonomous 
of merchants, more dominant over peasant entrepreneurs, and in some 
senses more capitalist. Caste, kinship, and ethnicity continued to flourish, 
however, creating complex networks of social patronage.55
Technical change further boosted productivity in India. There were indirect 
contributions from modern transport and from manufactured inputs, such 
as machine-made yarn, aniline dyes, and sheet metal. More directly, weavers 
adopted flying shuttles, beam warping, and metal Hattersley domestic looms 
with foot treadles. The gradual introduction of electric-powered looms further 
blurred the boundaries between workshops and factories. As for makers of 
brassware in Moradabad, near Delhi, they took to metal rolling, power forges, 
power tools for polishing, and eventually, electroplating in nickel and silver.56
The picture in East Asia was similarly mixed, despite Western portrayals 
of artisanal techniques as both “primitive” and unchanging.57 Improved 
wooden foot treadles initially stimulated weaving in China, as well as 
cotton ginning. Iron-gear looms, imported from Japan, marked a further 
step.58 Korean weavers also upgraded technologically.59 As late as 2004, 
Japanese artisans in Kyoto were weaving expensive silk obi belts for ki-
monos by hand, while computers generated the patterns for the weavers.60
West Java’s cotton-weaving industry is an instructive example of how 
a craft could be technically transformed, while clinging to apparently 
“traditional” forms of organization for institutional reasons. From the 1880s, 
wider looms, worked with treadles, produced mainly sarong, cotton cloth-
ing in the local style. After 1918, workshops – centred in Majalaya – thrived 
with imports of cheap and strong Japanese machine-made yarn, on which 
import duties were halved in 1927. The Textiel Inrichting Bandoeng (TIB), a 
research institute, developed a new handloom in 1922, and further ref ined 
it in 1926. A TIB loom was about f ive times more expensive than the existing 
55 Roy, Traditional Industry, pp. 20-23, 44-45, 131, 233; Haynes, Small Town Capitalism, pp. 5-18.
56 Roy, Traditional Industry, pp. 44-45, 61-62, 146-148; Morris, “Indian Industry and Business”, 
pp. 221-222; Haynes, Small Town Capitalism, pp. 3-18.
57 Hommel, China at Work.
58 Feuerwerker, The Chinese Economy, pp. 38, 43.
59 Larsen, “Competition in Absentia”.
60 Personal observation.
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ones, but it could produce about f ive times the output, and about a third of 
that of a power loom. Majalaya sarongs dominated Java’s internal market, 
especially from 1933, when Japanese imports were curtailed and yarn 
was relieved of all duty. Electrif ication began in 1935, power looms were 
introduced four years later, and some 500 had been installed in West Java by 
the beginning of 1942. However, workshops, often owned by entrepreneurs 
of Chinese and Hadhrami Arab extraction, rarely contained more than 
four looms, in order to avoid Dutch licensing and taxing of larger units. 
This artif icially made the sector appear less modern than it really was.61
Technical advances were not necessarily modern in nature. The thriving 
batik workshops of Java, which exported some of their output, adopted 
copper stamps (tjap/cap) from South Asia in the mid-nineteenth century. 
This greatly increased output and lowered production costs for cheaper 
batiks, while simultaneously expanding the arena of men’s work.62 The 
invention of the canting, a type of pen for the application of melted wax 
onto cloth, improved more expensive types of batik. This local invention, 
already in use around 1800, gradually spread.63
In some places, workshops converged with factories over time.64 Joel Mokyr 
refers to this in a Western context as “growing up”.65 This process also f itted 
in with a more general “labour-intensive path to industrialization”, which 
characterized much of Asia as well as parts of Europe.66 Thomas Smith’s pio-
neering work from the 1950s stresses convergence as a key to Japan’s industrial 
success, and Erich Pauer elegantly expands on the theme.67 Indeed, Masayuki 
Tanimoto’s edited collection shows how some modern Japanese industries 
gave way to smaller units over time, as in the pearl-button factories of Kan-
sai.68 In parts of China as well, such as Gaoyang County in the north, there 
were intimate connections between handicrafts and modern industries.69
61 Matsuo, Javanese Cotton Industry, pp. 18, 26-39, 47, 80; Segers, Manufacturing Industry, 
pp.  153-156; Dobbin, Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities, pp.  182-184; Sutter “Indonesianisasi”, 
pp. 42-44; Palmer, Textiles in Indonesia, pp. 19-23, 44; Oki, “A Note on the History”, p. 150; Antlöv 
and Svensson, “From Rural Home Weavers”, pp. 113-116; Lindblad, Bridges to New Business, p. 32.
62 Matsuo, Javanese Cotton Industry, pp. 78-79, 86; Kerlogue, Batik, p. 21. See Elise van Neder-
veen Meerkerk’s chapter in this volume.
63 Raff les, History of Java, vol. 1, pp. 168-169; Ponder, Javanese Panorama, pp. 139-140.
64 Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant, pp. 161-164; Owen, The Middle East, pp. 211, 240.
65 Cited in Pomeranz, The Pacific, p. xiv.
66 Austin, and Sugihara, Labour-Intensive Industrialization.
67 Smith, Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization, pp. 44-45; Pauer, “Traditional Technol-
ogy”. See also Macpherson, The Economic Development, pp. 12-15, 19-22.
68 Tanimoto, The Role of Tradition.
69 Pomeranz, The Pacific, p. xiv; Grove, A Chinese Economic Revolution.
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Certainly, British colonial planners in interwar India did not begin to 
grasp the need for a symbiotic association between artisanal and modern 
industry until late in the 1930s.70 Nevertheless, Tirthankar Roy argues co-
gently that “‘traditional’ industry represented one root of ‘modern’ industry 
in India”. For example, the workshops of the brass industry of Moradabad 
gave rise to modern metal industries.71
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America displayed much less continu-
ity between artisanal and industrial production. Madagascar, in many 
ways culturally Asian, provides a rare African example of textile artisans 
morphing into minor industrialists.72 Victor Bulmer-Thomas summarily 
dismisses any such evolution in Latin America, portraying factories merely 
as rivals to workshops, which suffered from shortages of capital, lack of 
sociopolitical influence, and the constraints of family labour.73 However, 
such problems were overcome elsewhere, and scarce labour may have been 
the main reason for the poor performance of handicrafts.74
Labour relations in the handicrafts sector
Craft production undoubtedly acted as a brake on proletarianization, 
especially when work took place in rural households. Workers were rarely 
separated from the means of production, and were thus not obliged to 
survive by selling their labour power, although they depended to varying 
degrees on craftwork to supplement their incomes. Reciprocity remained 
a major principle of labour allocation, mediated by a complex web of social 
relations of kinship, ethnicity, caste, and so forth. Tributary labour, notably 
slavery, also made an appearance in some cases. That said, wage labour 
slowly spread, notably in urban zones.
Putting-out, whereby traders supplied inputs to households, usually 
rural, and purchased f inished products, was common in European proto-
industry. Roy argues that this institution was rare in British India, although 
Haynes depicts the relationship between some weavers and Marwari traders 
in western India in this light.75 In addition, putting-out is said to have existed 
70 Tyabji, Colonialism, p. 210.
71 Roy, Traditional Industry, pp. 147-148, 231-233.
72 Fee, “Madagascar’s Textiles”.
73 Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History, pp. 131-132.
74 Austin and Sugihara, Labour-Intensive Industrialization.
75 Roy, Traditional Industry; Haynes, Small Town Capitalism, pp. 13-14.
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in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and China.76 In Java, the 1920s involved 
an upsurge in putting-out for batik production, in order to avoid a Dutch 
tax levied according to the number of employees.77
Craft workers in households were generally assumed to be free family 
members, but in southern Somalia’s cotton textile sector – located in cities 
rather than in the countryside – the situation was more complicated. Most 
Somali weavers were free, but of low caste. They spun and wove full time, 
and bought their food on the market. Family members assisted them, but 
so did slaves and free clients. The combination of diverse labour relations 
was especially apparent in this sector.78
Even in the slightly more institutional setting of workshops, a bewil-
dering variety of contracts and informal arrangements existed. In China, 
wage labour probably grew slowly overall, but economic shocks at times 
reversed this process. Large workshops employed many non-kin workers 
in textiles, cotton ginning, milling, and the production of salt, metals, and 
pottery. People classed as “peasant weavers” might have owned many looms, 
situated in different workshops.79
British India’s workshops were increasingly urban, and wage work 
gradually became more common, but share work and piece work frequently 
prevailed. Credit and apprenticeship tied workers to some extent, albeit 
never completely. The salience of caste varied greatly, being more significant 
in weaving than in metals.80 Indian weavers were being drawn into trade 
union activity and strikes by the 1930s.81
A major and unresolved debate over artisanal labour in the modern era 
concerns the extent to which standards of living fell, stagnated, or rose. In 
the Indian case, Tirthankar Roy hesitates, accepting that “self-exploitation” 
was a condition for survival in some cases.82 Douglas Haynes is more pes-
simistic, seeing immiseration as the norm.83 It is likely that outcomes were 
actually extremely diverse, and that improvements in productivity were a 
key to better conditions of life.
76 Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing, pp. 85-86; Feuerwerker The Chinese Economy, pp. 33, 38; 
Matsuo, Javanese Cotton Industry, p. 81; Boomgaard, Children of the Colonial State, pp. 126-129.
77 Vuldy, Pekalongan, pp. 124-125.
78 Alpers, “Futa Benaadir”, pp. 77-98.
79 Feuerwerker, The Chinese Economy, p. 31.
80 Roy, Traditional Industry, pp. 149-152, 222-228; Haynes, Small Town Capitalism, p. 14.
81 Haynes, Small Town Capitalism, p. 15.
82 Roy, Traditional Industry.
83 Haynes, Small Town Capitalism, p. 9.
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Import substitution of consumer goods under free trade, 1850s 
to 1914
Factories producing consumer goods for the internal market sprang up de 
novo in developing economies. As the cumbersome institutions of mercan-
tilism were dismantled, exports of machinery were no longer subject to high 
duties, or even outright prohibition. Cheap second-hand machinery, which 
was tried and tested, thus became abundantly available.84 The absence of 
state protection for industrialization also meant that only competitive 
factories flourished.
The most successful case of large-scale import substitution, leading 
over time to export substitution, was the Indian cotton-spinning industry, 
which Williamson inexplicably ignores. Despite a complete lack of tariff 
protection, modern industrial production of cotton goods began in British 
India in 1854, and grew rapidly from the 1870s to 1914. These cotton mills 
were almost entirely owned and f inanced by local entrepreneurs. Indian 
mills produced much more yarn than cloth, making India self-suff icient 
in yarn by the 1880s, and acting as a stimulus to handlooms. Indian yarn 
exports then largely replaced the British variety in the Indian Ocean and 
China Sea markets by 1906, and penetrated into the Ottoman Empire. By 
contrast, it was only in around 1910 that the woven output of Indian mills 
began to surpass that of local handlooms. Moreover, some imports of piece 
goods continued.85 Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) was unusual in having become 
self-suff icient in cotton textiles by 1913.86
Latin American import-substituting industrialization was not sustained, 
possibly because of excessive protection by newly independent govern-
ments. In Mexico, the creation of a modern textile industry benefited from 
a large internal market, numerous skilled artisans in old craft centres such 
as Puebla, vigorous local trade on mule back, and the natural protection 
afforded by Mexico’s tortured geography.87 However, manufacturing of this 
type was undermined by the advent of railways, which reduced the costs 
of imports.88
84 Kenwood and Lougheed, Technological Diffusion; Macpherson, The Economic Development, 
p. 13.
85 Morris, “Indian Industry and Business”, p. 204; Dobbin, Urban Leadership, pp. 154-156; 
Charlesworth, British Rule, pp. 34, 37-39. On Chinese imports, see Shiroyama, China during the 
Great Depression, pp. 42-50; on Ottoman imports, see Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing, p. 32.
86 Huff, “Boom-or-Bust Commodities”, p. 1085.
87 Halperín Donghi, “Economy and Society”, pp. 327-328.
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Egypt is routinely presented as an example of manufacturing that was 
strangled at birth by imperialism. It is true that Muhammad ‘Ali’s ambitious 
projects, especially in the f ield of cotton textiles, went into steep decline 
after Britain imposed free trade by treaty in 1838. However, Muhammad 
‘Ali’s industrial structure was fatally weakened by clumsy state interference, 
notably high rates of protection, monopolies, and forced labour. Moreover, 
the British occupation of Egypt, in 1882, was followed by a burst of free trade 
manufacturing growth, including cotton textiles, as well as soap, sugar, 
tobacco, and fertilizers, which most historians have ignored.89
Import substitution also progressed in states such as the Ottoman and 
Qing empires, which were not formally colonized, but were subject to 
“informal imperialism”. Despite being placed under the yoke of the Public 
Debt Administration from 1881, the Ottoman Empire witnessed steady 
growth in modern manufacturing. Textiles were at the fore, with a focus 
on spinning cotton and wool, and reeling silk, partly for export.90 As for 
China, foreign-owned cotton mills in Shanghai provoked the emergence 
of successful Chinese-owned mills up-country.91
Although free trade did not prevent import-substituting industries from 
emerging, structural factors limited expansion. Colonial parsimony argu-
ably hampered education, although Gregg Huff notes that male literacy in 
parts of Malaya had reached nearly 50 per cent by 1931.92 Shortages of social 
overhead capital more generally, and low demand from the agrarian sector, 
also played a part.93 However, Clive Dewey argues that it simply made more 
economic sense to focus on export processing.94
Import substitution of consumer goods under protection, 1914 
to 1950s
Protectionist impulses were felt in the global economy from the 1880s, but 
effective tariff rates remain subdued, and it took the First World War to 
seriously hobble free trade. The depressions of the early 1920s and early 
89 Issawi, An Economic History, pp. 236-239.
90 Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing, pp. 32-40, 125-127, 148-150; Owen, The Middle East, 
pp. 211-212.
91 Liu, “Paradoxical Development”, ch. 4; Shiroyama, China during the Great Depression, pp. 45-48.
92 Huff, “Boom-or-Bust Commodities”, pp. 1086-1087.
93 Dewey, “The Government of India”, pp. 215-257; Lal, The Hindu Equilibrium, pp. 189-190; 
Tomlinson, “Technical Education”.
94 Dewey, “The Government of India”, pp. 215-257.
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1930s compounded problems, and the Second World War completed the 
closing of economies.95
In this context, metropolitan opinion was divided over the development 
of colonial import-substituting industry. Persistent structural unemploy-
ment, emerging in the West after the First World War, made workers keen 
to safeguard their jobs. French manufacturers could not agree about the 
colonial option.96 Only the authoritarian regime of António de Oliveira 
Salazar in Portugal actually banned colonial industries, in 1936. This was 
political theatre, however, as the prohibition was full of loopholes, and was 
reversed as soon as war threatened communications with the empire.97
Nationalist movements in Africa and Asia increasingly clamoured 
for import-substituting manufacturing under state protection.98 For 
socialists, industry would reinforce a class structure favourable to their 
goals.99 After the Accra riots in the Gold Coast (Ghana) in early 1948, 
the Watson Commission of Enquiry reported that “at every turn, we 
are pressed with the cry of industrialization”.100 For many nationalists, 
however, manufacturing was a nebulous badge of progress, rather than a 
well-considered economic strategy.101 Heavy industry loomed large in such 
dreams, symbolically equated with Soviet and Nazi power.102 However, 
there were countercurrents. Most famously, Mahatma Gandhi set his 
face against disruptive manufacturing in British India, while sponsoring 
a renewal of handicrafts.103
White settlers were particularly successful in gaining the ear of off icials 
to implement import substitution under tariff protection. Wherever there 
was a danger of “poor whites” subverting racial stratif ication in colonial 
society, demands reached a crescendo. However, this kind of industry was 
often inefficient, especially when employment was subject to a racial “colour 
bar”.104
Most colonial off icials hesitated to support industrialization, fearing the 
social and political consequences of proletarianization and urbanization 
95 O’Brien, “Intercontinental Trade”; Capie, Tariffs and Growth.
96 Marseille, Empire Colonial; Marseille, “The Phases of French”.
97 Clarence-Smith, The Third Portuguese Empire, ch. 6.
98 Tyabji, Colonialism, pp. 96, 139.
99 Botwe-Asamoah, Kwame Nkrumah’s Politico-Cultural Thought.
100 Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism, p. 152.
101 Dewey, “The Government of India”, p. 234; Tomlinson, “Technical Education”, p. 328.
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after the Bolshevik triumph in 1917.105 They also disliked diasporic indus-
trialist communities, such as the Indians in East Africa, or the Chinese 
and the Hadhrami Arabs in Indonesia. Colonial authorities thus tended 
to promote manufacturing only in reaction to crises. Strikes and riots 
reflected unemployment, inflation, and shortages of wage goods, due to 
shipping bottlenecks or falling export revenues. Colonial authorities then 
undertook short-term and uncoordinated initiatives, of dubious economic 
value.106
The example of British India illustrates the problems with particular 
clarity. Off icials leant towards fashionable strategic autarky, and were 
trapped in a dualistic vision of modern heavy industry and romantic cottage 
crafts. However, heavy industry required a great deal of capital, foreign 
exchange, expensive machinery, scarce skilled labour, entrepreneurial 
know-how, and geographical concentration, while doing little to boost 
incomes. Indeed, when overly protected, the sector pushed up the cost 
of living, and consequently wages in the wider economy.107 A “beggar my 
neighbour” attitude protected Indian sugar from Javanese imports in the 
1930s, hindering the modernization of Indian production, while driving 
modern Javanese factories to the verge of bankruptcy. Emerging industrial 
sectors, dependent on the crutches of state aid, were badly located, employed 
too much capital and skilled labour, and could not compete in regional 
markets, let alone international ones.108 Colonial institutions charged with 
stimulating manufacturing were poorly supported and resourced.109 This 
was not just a colonial problem, for the authoritarian regime in Republican 
Turkey provides egregious examples of badly executed, state-directed 
autarkic industrialization.110
At the same time, a raft of policies indirectly hindered the expansion 
of import-substituting manufacturing, ref lecting colonial institutional 
structures. Off icials in British India stuck to rigidly balanced budgets, 
limiting the supply of services and depressing demand. They overvalued 
the exchange rate to avoid inflation and to secure the worth of remittances 
105 Butler, Industrialisation.
106 Havinden and Meredith, Colonialism and Development, pp. 159, 168-174; Drummond, Impe-
rial Economic Policy, pp. 439-443; Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism, ch. 7; Dick, Surabaya, 
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to the metropolis. A strong rupee may have been the main reason for 
India losing markets for cotton yarn exports to Japanese rivals. Measures 
to keep peasants on the land, by protecting them from expropriation 
through debt, choked off the f low of labour to towns, and caused rural 
stagnation, which in turn restricted overall spending power.111 Gregg Huff 
sees currency overvaluation as Malaya’s chief industrial constraint.112 
The scarcity of electricity supplies in rural areas was another structural 
barrier.113
China’s experience was more positive in this period, paradoxically be-
cause Chinese nationalists were barely in control of their vast state after the 
revolution of 1911, and were thus unable to grant much effective protection 
to their industries. China’s currency also remained competitively valued.114 
In this environment, Chinese industrialization powered ahead, in sectors 
as diverse as tobacco and rubber goods. Even all-out war with Japan from 
1937 did not entirely halt the process.115
Japan itself provides an object lesson in sensible protection, at least up to 
the imposition of militarist autarky in the 1930s, when living standards f irst 
began to decline. Up to the 1920s, the country’s economy rested largely on a 
textile industry that had deep rural and pre-modern roots.116 As late as 1928, 
six out of ten of Japan’s leading industries in terms of employment, including 
the top three, were in this sector.117 After regaining tariff autonomy in 1911, 
governments remained highly selective about import duties. Tariffs were 
steep on “luxuries”, and gave some support to “infant industries”, but were 
low on imports of vital inputs for manufacturing.118
Export processing concealed
Export-processing industrialization was probably much more important 
than the import-substituting variety, but statistical quirks obscure this. 
Tables appear to reveal a deepening concentration on exports of “raw 
111 Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India; Charlesworth, British Rule, pp. 38-39, 64-65.
112 Huff, “Boom-or-Bust Commodities”, pp. 1080, 1087, 1100.
113 Tyabji, Colonialism, pp. 19, 30-31, 210.
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materials”. For example, steam-driven f ilatures for silk developed from 
1861 in China, but export statistics did not reflect this till 1894. Even then, all 
exports in this branch continued to be misleadingly labelled as “raw silk”.119
Much modern export-processing industry was simply not recorded. In 
British India up to 1911, off icial reports excluded enterprises employing 
fewer than fifty workers, as well as plant working for less than four months a 
year. Many industrial establishments in India are therefore known only from 
descriptive and photographic records, whether they were shelling ground-
nuts, ginning and pressing cotton, or milling rice.120 A similar problem besets 
reporting in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, where cotton gins and presses, 
steam-powered flour mills, and modern oil mills were ignored.121
Although “low tech” industries, especially those tucked away in remote 
rural locations, could be hard to detect, the most casual observer could not 
fail to miss a range of export-processing facilities, which were both preco-
cious and physically impressive. The technical requirements of grinding 
mills and boiling houses for Caribbean sugar may even have influenced 
the development of the Industrial Revolution in Britain.122 “Factories in the 
f ields” certainly pioneered industrial advances in the processing of sugar 
cane,123 and mechanized sugar production then spread around the tropical 
world.124 Another instance of early and large-scale export processing was 
the dressing and smelting of mineral ores.125 David Igler argues persuasively 
that the industrialization of California before 1941 has been hidden from 
view by historians’ refusal to consider this sector as an industrial one.126
Enframing is a major problem in this respect, as historians fail to notice 
that empirical material contradicts standard interpretative frameworks. 
Thus, Yoshiko Nagano intones the familiar mantra that the Philippines 
after 1898 became “dependent” on the USA as an exporter of raw materials. 
However, she then proceeds to demonstrate, in fascinating empirical detail, 
how capital was poured into the mechanical preparation of sugar, coconut 
oil, and Manila hemp for export to America.127
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Export processing under free trade, 1850s to 1914
Free trade was especially conducive to adding value to exports, an industrial 
sector that often employed more labour than any other.128 Williamson fails 
to realise that prof its arising from favourable terms of trade stimulated 
capital intensity in export processing, partly to overcome bottlenecks in 
production.129 Thus, sugar factories in Java reinvested retained prof its to 
achieve ever more mechanization, as costs of imported machinery and 
chemical fertilizers fell in tandem with the maritime costs of exporting 
sugar overseas.130
Williamson emphasizes the negative impact of price volatility with re-
gard to primary goods, and yet he ignores hedging against price movements 
through the issuing of futures contracts on specialized exchanges.131 Such 
exchanges multiplied in the course of the nineteenth century, allowing 
economic actors to know the price that they would receive in advance, while 
leaving speculators to carry the risks of price fluctuations. This certainty of 
capital returns favoured long-term investment in processing.132
Clive Dewey argues persuasively that adding value to raw materials for 
export was British India’s most promising avenue to industrialization, in 
terms of the allocation of scarce resources of capital and skilled labour, 
but he misses further advantages.133 First, for poor territories with small 
internal markets, access to the world allowed for production on a scale 
appropriate to new technologies. Second, export processing could lead 
organically to the import substitution of consumer goods. For example, soap 
works for the local market were a logical extension of processing coconut 
oil for export in southern India.134 Third, consumer goods produced in this 
way for the internal market might eventually be exported. In this way, 
Tan Kah-Kee progressed from milling rubber in the Malay Peninsula to 
producing rubber footwear for local requirements, and then to exporting 
this footwear.135 “Resource-based industrialization” is therefore attracting 
increasing attention.136
128 Brown, Economic change, p. 204.
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132 Williams, “The Origins of Futures Markets”; Engel, “Buying Time”.
133 Dewey, “The Government of India”.
134 Tyabji, Colonialism, pp. 138, 198-200.
135 Tan, The Memoirs of Tan Kah-kee; Goldthorpe, Rubber Manufacturing, p. 65.
136 Goldthorpe, Rubber Manufacturing.
tHe InduStRIaLIZatIon of tHe deveLoPInG woRLd 49
Export-substituting industries could simultaneously provide goods for 
local markets at lower prices. As Southeast Asia became the world’s rice 
granary from the mid-nineteenth century, steam mills proliferated, both 
small up-country units and large factories in port towns. While most of the 
milled rice was exported, its price on the internal market fell.137
The examples of Australia and New Zealand, underdeveloped and poor 
countries at the beginning of the nineteenth century, shows that exporting 
processed raw materials could be an effective avenue to development. 
Similar to other thinly populated temperate zones, these antipodean lands 
achieved high productivity and a comfortable standard of living by export-
ing mainly animal and mineral products. Indeed, protecting consumer 
manufacturing for the internal market in the interwar years may well have 
retarded Australia’s long-term economic development.138
Countries with a similar resource endowment in Latin America enjoyed 
less success, but essentially because of institutional weaknesses.139 Victor 
Bulmer-Thomas mentions precocious Latin American industrial processing 
of animal products, sugar, and mineral ores, and yet he does so briefly, and 
in a disparaging tone.140 Celso Furtado, a dependentista, recognizes that 
processing agricultural and animal goods constituted “the original nucleus 
of modern Argentine industry”, but he sees this merely as a step on the path 
to “real” industrialization.141
Japan’s modern economic trajectory is a striking example of the value 
of an export-processing strategy. Japan “caught up” with the West after the 
Meiji Restoration of 1868 by ever more effectively exporting processed tea 
and silk, taking over a substantial part of China’s international market 
share. Indeed, silk still accounted for 46 per cent of Japan’s total merchan-
dise exports in the early 1920s. By contrast, governments quickly abandoned 
clumsy and loss-making state-directed efforts to create heavy industry in 
the 1880s,142 yet William Macpherson refers dismissively to “raw silk, often 
categorized as a primary rather than a secondary product”.143
Other countries failed to replicate Japan’s success, even if their achieve-
ments have been underestimated. China established steam f ilatures for 
137 Brown, Economic Change, pp. 204-205.
138 Cochrane, Industrialization and Dependence; Denoon, Settler Capitalism.
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silk from the 1860s, and they expanded from the 1880s.144 From the 1860s 
also, an “industrial revolution overtook the tea-garden factories, as steam-
powered equipment for withering, rolling, f iring, and sorting black tea 
steadily replaced workers skilled in these tasks”.145 Debin Ma attributes 
China’s inability to build on these developments to political and institu-
tional weaknesses.146 Silk reeling also developed into a signif icant modern 
industry in Lebanon and Northwestern Anatolia, albeit without working 
any long-term developmental magic on the Middle East.147
The uneven distribution of export processing
A striking aspect of export processing was its unevenness. For example, 
sugar was generally transformed at source more than coffee, and palm oil 
more than rubber.148 Similarly, base metal ores were processed more than 
gemstones. An identical commodity might even receive different degrees 
of treatment according to location and f irms. Thus, British Malaya led the 
way in intensifying the milling of rubber.149
Some commodities were speedily processed because they would oth-
erwise have deteriorated, for example, the sucrose content of sugar cane 
quickly falling after harvesting.150 With vegetable oils, rapid acidif ication 
posed a similar problem.151 Animal and f ish products rotted, if they were 
not dried, salted, chilled, frozen, tinned, or otherwise preserved. Precocious 
export-oriented factories therefore prepared salted meat for export from 
southern South America from the middle of the nineteenth century.152 A 
more modest example concerns the f ish and whale factories of coastal 
southern Angola.153
In some cases, the extent of processing at source depended on the desired 
end products. Simple milling turned rubber into smoked and dried sheets, 
which could be stored for a long time in situ, to be exported at leisure to 
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make tyres and other products. By contrast, more sophisticated industrial 
treatment was required, immediately after tapping, to make liquid latex 
for the manufacture, by moulding, of surgical gloves and similar goods.154
In other cases, substantial transport savings were secured by processing 
prior to shipment.155 Thus, mineral ores were treated close to mines, espe-
cially when their mineral content was low.156 Diamonds, by comparison, took 
up little room, and relied on highly skilled and specialized communities 
elsewhere for cutting and polishing.157 Sawing logs into planks saved much 
precious space on ships, compared to shipping circular tree trunks.158
There were differences between colonial empires, in part because of 
higher rates of protection adopted by poorer metropoles with small and 
uncompetitive industrial sectors.159 Thus, in 1894, groundnuts were im-
ported in their shells from Senegal for oil mills in Marseilles, rather than 
being locally decorticated in West Africa.160 Groundnuts were exported 
shelled from South India, but high duties on imported vegetable oils in many 
Western countries frustrated plans for oil milling in Madras, whether based 
on groundnuts, copra (coconut flesh), or other oilseeds.161
Britain was more relaxed than most about importing vegetable oils, so 
that obstacles to colonial industrialization tended to be economic in nature. 
Export processors were cautious about investing in expensive buildings 
and machinery, as interest rates were high in peripheral areas. Moreover, 
investment was at the mercy of vagaries in the world economy. United 
Plantations bravely inaugurated a state-of-the-art palm oil factory in Malaya 
in 1933, in the midst of the ravages of the Great Depression.162
Hardest of all to explain is why more value was added to the same 
commodity in different places, notably in Asia compared to in Africa. For 
example, tin was exported for a long time as roughly washed mineral ore 
from Nigeria and the Belgian Congo, with a metal content of around 25 per 
cent, whereas it was smelted in Malaya to 90 per cent or higher purity.163 
By 1911, the Straits Trading Company of British Malaya smelted about a 
154 Polhamus, Rubber, pp. 203-207.
155 Brown, Economic Change, p. 207.
156 Thoburn, Tin in the World Economy, pp. 7-8. Also see Rossana Barragán’s chapter in this 
volume.
157 Hofmeester, “Shifting Trajectories”.
158 Bullock, Timber, p. 126.
159 Clarence-Smith, The Third Portuguese.
160 Smith, Peanuts, p. 67.
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third of the world’s output of tin ore, drawing on local supplies, but also 
on shipments from Siam, Yunnan (Southwestern China), Indochina, and 
Indonesia.164 Possible reasons for Africa’s lesser degree of processing were its 
closer proximity to Western markets, a smaller scale of mining, insuff icient 
energy and capital, and inadequate labour skills.
Export processing under threat, 1914 to 1940s
After 1914, many earlier advantages for export processing were curtailed. 
Imperial autarky meant that industries had to produce for an empire rather 
than for the world. For the Portuguese Empire, which was quite small, this 
implied radically shrinking horizons. Certainly, colonial manufactures, 
such as tinned f ish from southern Angola, were re-exported from Lisbon, 
but at substantial cost.165 Major industries were sacrif iced on the altar of 
ineff icient import substitution in other lands, for example, Java losing its 
sugar market in British India.166
Pressures to save, or create, jobs in the West increased, as structural 
unemployment took hold after the First World War. For instance, in 1928, 
the Billiton Company opened a tin-smelting works in Arnhem, in the 
Netherlands. From 1933, an increasing proportion of Indonesia’s tin ore was 
redirected to Arnhem, whereas it had earlier gone to smelters in the Malay 
Peninsula.167 By this stage, Malayan smelters were exporting almost pure tin 
metal.168 That said, the need to cut shipping costs in the Great Depression 
led to a modest increase in the processing of tin ore in the Belgian Congo.169
Another example of increased metropolitan protectionism was the “sugar 
trusts”, which kept the f inal steps of sugar ref ining in Britain and the USA, 
rather than allowing them to occur in producer territories.170 However, 
companies argued that locating sugar refineries close to their main markets 
meant that they could obtain unref ined sugar from various sources, and 
could therefore operate all year round.171
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It is currently impossible to draw up a balance sheet for export processing 
after 1914, as historians have neglected the sector, but growth probably 
slowed rather than stopped. Descriptive evidence is often all that exists. 
Thus, in the 1930s, one observer commented on Saigon’s large mechanized 
rice mills, housed in “ugly buildings, several stories high”, and employing 
machinery made in Germany or America.172
The industrialization of the service sector
The application of modern industrial methods to the provision of services 
has been even more neglected, due to a def inition of industry restricted 
to the production of goods. In reality, transport and energy sectors were 
susceptible to high levels of industrialization, in contrast to f inance or 
education. The vast body of literature on modern transport rarely considers 
it as a process of industrialization, and the same can be said about electric-
ity, which had to be generated within a limited distance from consumers.173 
Thus, the industrial impact on California of a behemoth like the Southern 
Pacific Railroad has generally been ignored.174 This is strange, because trans-
port may well have been the single most striking application of industrial 
methods in developing economies. From steamships to railways, and from 
automotive vehicles to aircraft, the situation was radically transformed.175 
These technologies have been amply discussed as “tools of empire”, but not 
as contributions to industrialization.176
The industrialization of transport and energy was intimately linked to 
other forms of manufacturing. Rural electrif ication was seen as the key to 
developing all forms of industry in India in the interwar years.177 Transport 
was a necessity for many forms of export processing in remote locations. 
Indeed, the industrialization of agricultural and mining firms often took the 
form of building light railways, with locomotives slowly replacing animals 
to pull wagons.178
172 Brown, Economic Change, p. 204.
173 Headrick, Power over Peoples; Hausman, Hertner, and Wilkins, Global Electrification.
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Intermediate and capital goods for local markets
Historians have equally neglected the manufacture of intermediate and light 
capital goods. Demand for such products arose from the needs of a particularly 
broad range of economic actors, such as other factories, plantations, mines, 
construction, transport, energy, government, and the armed forces. Repair 
and maintenance workshops sprung up quickly, and many of them morphed 
into small factories producing spare parts. They initially met the needs of 
locomotives and steamers, and then increasingly those of motor vehicles.179 
India’s railway workshops, employing some of the most modern industrial 
technology in the colony, were long unjustly neglected by researchers.180
Engineering f irms became increasingly signif icant over time. In the 
Javanese industrial hub of Surabaya, transport and sugar enterprises were 
their main markets.181 Similar companies, clustered in Kuala Lumpur and 
Ipoh, supplied rubber-milling machinery to Malaya, as well as pumps and 
dredges to extract tin from marshland.182 Singapore was another centre, 
sending railway brake f ittings across much of Asia by 1941.183 The Socf in 
plantation group set up a subsidiary in Northern Sumatra in the 1930s, the 
Medansche Machine Fabriek, which produced storage tanks for palm oil 
prior to shipment.184 Mysore and Madras f irms made soap machinery, paddy 
separators, centrifugal pumps, and acetone for rubber coagulation, the latter 
as a by-product of Mysore’s iron works.185 In the 1860s, Shanghai’s f irst silk-
reeling factories used engines, boilers, and reeling equipment manufactured 
in Hong Kong.186 From 1917, the electrification of China resulted in a flourish-
ing local production of electrical equipment.187 Coffee planters invested in 
turning out boilers, pumps, and boxcars in the Brazilian state of São Paulo, 
the largest regional industrial agglomeration in Latin America by the 1940s.188
Production of intermediate goods for local markets benefited from natural 
protection afforded by transport costs. Bulky and heavy products, especially 
if they were easily made from local raw materials and with local labour, 
179 Dick, Surabaya, ch. 5.
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182 Goldthorpe, Rubber Manufacturing, p. 63.
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needed little or no tariff protection. Construction materials are typical for 
this sector, especially cement, but also bricks, tiles, pipes, tanks, plaster, 
lime, gravel, stone, and sawn timber, with the size and capital intensity of 
plant varying greatly. Agricultural exports required sacking, made from jute, 
sisal, hemp, or similar f ibres, some of which also served to produce ropes and 
twine. Barrels, chests, and other containers were used to package exports. 
Tin cans were made in Indonesia from 1913 to hold kerosene, produced locally, 
together with petrol, aviation fuel, diesel oil, paraff in wax, asphalt, and so 
forth. Chemicals, such as sulphuric acid or vegetable oils for flotation, entered 
into the treatment of mineral ores. Railways consumed huge quantities of 
wooden sleepers and gravel, and India produced iron rails. Glass bottles and 
flasks served for locally produced beverages, such as beer and mineral water. 
In small territories, manufacturers developed regional export markets.189
Historians of India and China, inf luenced by communist notions, 
have been at the fore in arguing that all this was insuff icient, as it did not 
amount to the “holy grail” of producing heavy capital goods.190 However, a 
reluctance to produce such goods may have been wise, given that economi-
cally draining “white elephants” in these sectors became the bane of many 
independent countries after 1945.
Labour relations in modern industries in the developing world
Modern industry, in all its sectors, was more likely to employ wage labour 
than handicrafts, but this was not a “default setting”. There is nothing about 
the def inition of modern industry used in this chapter that indicates that 
industrial workers must be divorced from the means of subsistence, and 
thus obliged to sell their labour power.
Modern industry could even employ slave labour.191 Meat packing and 
tallow plants, the largest and most advanced industrial units of southern 
South America in the nineteenth century, contained a mixture of free 
and slave workers. Slaves were soon conf ined to Brazil, however, where 
slavery lasted till 1888, whereas the institution was abolished soon after 
independence in the Hispanic republics.192 Similarly, the f ish-processing 
189 Brown, Economic Change, ch. 14; Clarence-Smith, “The Effects of the Great Depression”, 
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plants of southern Angola relied on slave labour in reality, tolerated by 
the authorities until the Republican Revolution of 1910.193 Slavery was an 
institution of civil society, buttressed by religion and politics, and it took 
major crises to shift the institutional landscape.
The suppression of slavery did not entail a simple transition to wage 
labour. G. Roger Knight demonstrates how population pressure and land 
shortage combined to produce some early proletarianization in Java, with 
gangs of landless men travelling across the island for casual wage employ-
ment in sugar factories. However, there were many other types of workers 
in sugar factories who had some access to rural resources.194 Indeed, this 
provides a classic example of the combination of different labour relations 
in a single plant. Among the most proletarianized workers in Java, and 
forming the spearhead of worker militancy, were those employed by the 
increasingly industrialized transport system.195
In the case of British India, local jobbers controlled an unstable, free 
labour force, characterized by high turnover. The salience of caste is hotly 
debated, although industrial workers were clearly drawn from a variety of 
castes. Moreover, by 1931, about four-f ifths of the workers in Indian cotton 
textile mills were men, contrasting with predominantly women in Japan 
and the Middle East. The significance of jobbers in organizing the workforce 
in India meant that labour was not subsumed to capital according to classic 
models.196
The processes of proletarianization may have stalled, or even gone into 
reverse, from 1914, as Southern Africa became a model for a particular form 
of social engineering. The region had a well-established export-processing 
sector – notably for minerals – and an expanding consumer goods industry, 
stimulated by extensive protectionism. Worried by the social and political 
threats posed by proletarianization and urbanization, political leaders 
tried to artif icially shore up rural subsistence production and to enforce 
repatriation to rural labour reserves. Representing white voters, politicians 
were keen to ward off the “black peril”. At the same time, employers saw 
this as a way of lowering wages, by not having to pay for the subsistence 
needs of a worker’s family.197
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Conclusion
It is not possible to maintain that developing economies deindustrialized 
from the 1840s to 1914. Instead, there was an initial sensible emphasis on 
export-processing manufacturing, benefiting from a broadly free trading 
environment. This went together with the industrialization of key services, 
the factory production of intermediate and light capital goods, and a little 
import substitution, which benefited from not being distorted by protec-
tive tariffs. At the same time, a large number of handicrafts survived and 
flourished, and some evolved in a more industrial direction, serving not 
only the internal market, but also foreign customers.
Conversely, the argument that industrial growth in the Global South 
speeded up from 1914 is open to considerable doubt. As protectionism 
gripped the world, problematic and limited forms of import substitution 
of consumer goods emerged in colonial and semi-colonial lands. These were 
typically the fruit of uncoordinated off icial reactions to short-term crises. 
Such schemes suffered from excessive protection through tariffs and other 
measures, poor linkages with other industries and economic sectors, and 
great locational ineff iciencies.
At the same time, greater barriers to export-processing manufacturing 
emerged from 1914, and the role played in this by organized labour in the 
West needs to be better understood. There has been such a strong emphasis 
on protectionism emanating from capitalists manipulating governments 
that the roots of such measures in labour movements, which were institu-
tions of civil society, have been largely ignored. This is perhaps the topic 
that the enframing of research agendas has obscured the most.
In general terms, Williamson correctly pinpoints the low productivity of 
labour as a major explanation for relatively low levels of industrialization 
in developing economies, but he wrongly attributes this productivity gap 
to specialization in the production of raw materials for export. In real-
ity, there were deep historical roots governing how labour skills evolved. 
Productivity was further influenced by policies on education, health, and 
the provision of other public goods, all of which need to be comprehended 
from an institutional perspective.
The implications of modern experiences of industrialization in the 
Global South for the general schema of labour relations proposed by the 
collaboratory are important, even though they do not necessarily suggest 
that more commodified labour existed than historians have thought to date. 
Indeed, taking manufacturing in all its astonishing diversity, this chapter 
reinforces the notion that labour relations did not march forward through 
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time in clearly delineated stages. Instead, manufacturing was characterized 
by complex combinations of labour relations, similar to those in other 
economic sectors. Wage labour might at times have progressed, but it could 
also regress. There is a need to study empirical experiences with great care, 
avoiding becoming enframed within ideological presuppositions.
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